Last November, Russia launched a PL19 Nudol interceptor missile targeting a long-out-of-service Soviet-era Cosmos 1408 satellite orbiting 300 miles above the Earth and blew it to smithereens.
The resulting 1,500 pieces of trackable space junk threatened the seven-member crew of the International Space Station, including two Russian cosmonauts, who had to shelter in their transport spacecraft as the station passed perilously close to the debris field.
Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, America’s first chief of space operations, called it a “completely irresponsible test that didn’t have to happen,” but what he couldn’t call it was illegal.
The Russian test of its direct-ascent anti-satellite missile not only demonstrated the vulnerability of defenseless satellites, but it also underscored the fact that there are very few rules in space.
“I will tell you that low Earth orbit and space, in general, is the wild, wild west,” Raymond testified last May before a House appropriations subcommittee. “Basically, two rules: Can’t put weapons of mass destruction in space, and you can’t build a base on a planet. Other than that, it’s largely the wild, wild west.”
Those rules cited by Raymond come from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which states activities in space shall be conducted “with due regard” to the interests of others.
“This is our wake-up call because that test was not illegal. It was not against any law. We can argue all day long that it did not show ‘due regard’ for the activities of others in space, but we don’t know what ‘due regard’ means,” said Michelle Hanlon, an instructor of space law at the University of Mississippi, in a recent BBC interview. “This is the wake-up call for the international community to really start getting those rules together.”
With space becoming more congested, contested, and competitive, Raymond has been working to help establish a system of norms so that actions like Russia’s destruction of its satellite are clearly unacceptable.
“I’m not naive to think that if we have rules of the road that everybody is going to follow them,” Raymond said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event this month. “But I do think it’s going to help us identify those folks that are running the red lights and not playing by the rules.”
But Raymond’s bigger worry, as four-star head of the new Space Force, is that Russia and China are increasingly challenging America’s once unsurpassed dominance in space.
“They’ve demonstrated by their actions that they’re developing capabilities to deny us our access to space,” Raymond said. “China has built a very robust space architecture that will give them the same advantages that we have. … China has gone very, very fast, and I think the economic engine that they have has allowed them to go at a speed that is really concerning.”
Raymond previously confirmed that China has developed so-called killer satellites, including the Shijian 17, which is equipped with a robotic arm that can reach out and grab other satellites.
With America’s satellites still dominating the heavens, that means the United States has more to lose if war comes to space.
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, of the 4,550 satellites circling the Earth every 90 minutes, 2,788, or 60%, belong to the U.S., and 2,359 are commercial satellites, including 1,900 providing internet over Elon Musk’s Starlink constellation.
But almost 400 are U.S. government or military satellites that provide everything from the GPS signals for civilian navigation to early warnings of a nuclear attack, targeting guidance for high-tech bombs and missiles, and reconnaissance and secure communications — all things vital for warfighting.
By comparison, China has 431 and Russia has 167 satellites in orbit.
Both China and Russia, and for that matter, the U.S., have demonstrated the capability to knock out a satellite in orbit. Still, less destructive terrestrial weapons can have the same effect surreptitiously.
Satellites can be blinded by lasers, or jammed with radio waves, making their signals unusable.
The Defense Intelligence Agency has estimated that China will likely field a ground-based laser weapon that could destroy low Earth orbit space sensors by the end of this decade.
“These nonkinetic forms of attack on space systems are actually more dangerous to us because they’re often seen as something that can be used in peacetime, their effects are reversible, and they aren’t necessarily publicly visible,” said Todd Harrison, director of the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS.
Harrison was the lead author of a report issued by his think tank last year, outlining the vulnerabilities of U.S. military satellites and recommending strategies for protecting space systems from counterspace weapons.
“Space is not a sanctuary,” the report warned. “What is different today is that the ability of the United States to deter attacks in space is in doubt.”
Harrison argued there are various ways to protect satellites from attacks, including adding defensive systems to blind or jam anti-satellite missiles to good old-fashioned deterrence.
“Ultimately, deterrence is about making your adversary understand that the cost of attacking us this way is not worth the benefit,” Harrison said. “The way that you make deterrence more viable for space is you raise the cost of attacking our space systems, make them harder to attack.”
Harrison argued that one way to accomplish that is to change the kind of satellites the U.S. deploys in the future.
“Instead of relying on a small number of very expensive, very capable satellites, we should instead have more dispersed and proliferated constellations where each satellite is smaller, less expensive, less capable,” he said.
“The advantage of a dispersed and proliferated constellation is that even if they successfully attack one or two or a dozen of your satellites, you can still operate, you can still do the mission,” he added. “It’s not feasible, not practical for them to try to attack all of your satellites at once.”
The Washington-based Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies proposed a more controversial solution in a policy paper released this month, calling for the development of nuclear propulsion systems to allow for maneuver warfare in space, essentially the ability of satellites to change orbits or move into deeper space to evade an attack.
“This technology will allow DOD to adopt a space strategy that includes fielding a maneuverable force that is more survivable and has other operational defensive and offensive benefits,” argued Christopher Stone, author of the report.
“It’s a classic fighter jock approach to space,” countered Harrison. “Your best bet is to not maneuver. Your best bet is to blind the sensors as [an anti-satellite missile] is coming in.”
He added: “An ASAT warhead is designed to be much more maneuverable. … In many cases, maneuver in and of itself is not a sufficient option.”
Many of the programs the Space Force is pursuing to protect U.S. satellites are classified, and the nation’s most senior space guardian won’t talk about them in public.
“We’re working across all the organization to do space acquisition to design our force structure in a way that is less susceptible to the threat,” Raymond told Congress last year. “The threat is real today and concerning.”
Jamie McIntyre is the Washington Examiner’s senior writer on defense and national security. His morning newsletter, “Jamie McIntyre’s Daily on Defense,” is free and available by email subscription at dailyondefense.com.
